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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CIVIL RIGHTS-UNION USE OF DUES FOR POLITICAL 
ACTION-Defendant unions under the authority of section 2, Eleventh of the 
Railway Labor Actl obtained union shop agreements from defendant rail-
roads. Non-union employees sought to enjoin enforcement of the agree-
ments because the unions used periodic dues, fees, and assessments to sup-
port political doctrines and candidates opposed by plaintiffs. The trial 
court dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, but the Supreme Court 
of Georgia overruled the dismissal and remanded.2 The lower court then 
ruled that petitioners were denied constitutional liberties and issued the 
injunction. On appeal, held, affirmed. Enforcement of union shop con-
tracts requiring employees to pay periodic dues, fees and assessments, por-
tions of which are used to support political programs and candidates op-
164 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. (1958) §152, Eleventh. Prior to 1951 the Railway 
Labor Act expressly prohibited union shops in the railroad industry. Section 2, Eleventh, 
adopted in 1951, removed the restriction. Notwithstanding any state or federal law, union 
shops were made valid. 
2 Looper v. Georgia Southern & Florida Ry. Co., 213 Ga. 279, 99 S.E. (2d) 101 (1957). 
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posed by certain employees, deprives those employees of their freedom of 
speech and freedom to contract under the First and Fifth Amendments to 
the Federal Constitution. International Association of Machinists v. Street, 
215 Ga. 27, 108 S.E. (2d) 796 (1959), probable jurisdiction noted 28 U.S. 
LAW WEEK 3108 (1959). 
The use of dues, fees and assessments in the principal case presents no 
Fifth Amendment issue. It was decided by the Supreme Court in Railway 
Employes' Department, A.F.L. v. Hansons that required financial support 
of a union by employees receiving the benefits did not violate the Fifth 
Amendment. The important issue in the principal case is whether the use 
of union funds for political purposes violates the First Amendment. Section 
2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act authorizes union shop, notwithstand-
ing contrary state law or policy. Contracts made in states having no law 
or policy opposed to union shop carry no imprint of federal authority.4 
The Hanson case presented a clash between Nebraska's right to work law5 
and the notwithstanding any state or national law language6 of section 2, 
Eleventh. The Court upheld section 2, Eleventh as a proper exercise by 
Congress of the commerce power. The effect of the holding was to negate 
state right to work laws in so far as they conflict with section 2, Eleventh. 
In Hanson plaintiffs argued that compulsory membership would be used 
to impair freedom of speech. The Court said that no First Amendment 
question was presented because Congress had safeguarded against infringe-
ment by limiting union power to deny or terminate membership to cases 
in which employees refused to tender periodic dues, initiation fees and 
assessments. Judgment was expressly reserved on the enforceability of a 
union shop agreement" ... if the exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assess-
ments is used as a cover for forcing ideological conformity or other action 
in contravention of the First Amendment .... "7 The Georgia court thought 
that the facts of the principal case brought it within the Hanson reserva-
tion.8 Whether this position is correct depends on what activities the United 
3 351 U.S. 225 (1956). See also Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron &: 
Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949), holding that a Nebraska right to work law, which limited 
employer-employee freedom to arrange conditions of work by prohibiting union shops, 
did not deprive unions or management of liberty or due process. 
4 Otten v. Staten Island Rapid Transit Ry. Co., (2d Cir. 1956) 229 F. (2d) 919, cert. 
den. 351 U.S. 983 (1956); Wicks v. Southern Pacific Co., (9th Cir. 1956) 231 F. (2d) 130, 
cert. den. 351 U.S. 946 (1956); Otten v. Baltimore&: 0. R. Co., (2d Cir. 1953) 205 F. (2d) 58. 
The Georgia court found that the enforcement of union shop agreements was contrary to 
the constitution, law and public policy of Georgia and contrary to the statutes or laws of 
the other states in which defendant railroads operated. 
5 Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943; reissue, 1952) §48-217. 
6 "Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, or of any other statute or 
law of the United States, or Territory thereof, or of any State •.. " See note I supra. 
7 351 U.S. 225 at 238 (1956). Judgment was also reserved on cases involving conditions 
of membership other than periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments. 
8 Contra: Sandsberry v. Intl. Assn. of Machinists, 156 Tex. 340, 295 S.W. (2d) 412 
(1956); Allen v. Southern Ry. Co., 249 N.C. 491, 107 S.E. (2d) 125 (1959). Both hold that 
the questions reserved in Hanson were not intended to include cases in which union dues 
were used in political activities. 
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States Supreme Court would deem attempts to force ideological conformity. 
The language in Hanson indicates that the Court was not referring to union 
activities germane to collective bargaining.9 The proposition that consid-
erable expenditure of funds for political purposes is germane seems to have 
become established. For example, in cases involving alleged violations of 
what is now section 610 of the United States Criminal Code,10 it has been 
consistently held that union use of funds to publish union newspapers with 
political overtones does not constitute a violation.11 However, the Supreme 
Court has ruled that union sponsorship of television broadcasts which in-
volved political advocacy intended to influence the voting public and 
affect the results of an election stated an offense under the prohibitions of 
section 610.12 In the principal case it was stipulated that funds exacted 
from plaintiffs were used for lobbying in state legislatures, and the trial 
court found that funds were also being used in substantial amounts to sup-
port political campaigns of candidates for federal and state offices. There 
seems to be little argument that lobbying is germane to collective bargain-
ing, but direct contributions to campaign funds are questionable. But even 
if union political activities are not germane it is still difficult to find forced 
ideological conformity.13 No belief is required as a condition of employ-
ment. The employees remain free to advocate the cause of their choice. 
Therefore, the Hanson reservation would seem inapplicable. However, 
even if it were found that defendant unions are forcing ideological con-
formity, it would still be necessary to determine whether this violates the 
First Amendment. If the federal government cannot force ideological con-
formity, unions through contracts bearing the imprint of federal authority 
should not be allowed to do so. Although fear of disturbing the country's 
economic well being by uprooting union shop might seem to direct a con-
trary conclusion, the principal case may not have such an effect since it is 
doubtful that a determination of unconstitutionality would affect indus-
tries not subject to the Railway Labor Act.14 Cases arising under the act 
reach a constitutional question because the notwithstanding clause of sec-
tion 2, Eleventh imparts to union shop the imprint of federal authority. 
The Labor-Management Relations Act of 194715 contains no provision 
identical in content to section 2, Eleventh. Section 8 (a) (3) provides only 
9 See 351 U.S. 225 at 235 (1956). 
10 18 U.S.C. (1958) §610; formerly §313 of the Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 (43 Stat. 
1074) as amended by §304 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 159). 
11 E.g., United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 335 U.S. 106 (1948). 
12 United States v. Intl. Union United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Imple-
ment Workers of America, 352 U.S. 567 (1957). But see United States v. Painters Local 
Union No. 481, (2d Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 854 • 
.13 Cf. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. I (1947), dealing with coercion of 
conscience in regard to use of tax monies to reimburse parents for the cost of sending 
children to private or parochial schools via a public bus system. 
;t4 It is also doubtful that there would be any very significant effects in the railway 
industry. Union shop was prohibited until 1951; the unions achieved their power and 
growth with1ut the aid of union shop contracts. 
15 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §§151-168. 
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that nothing in the act shall preclude an employer from entering into 
union shop agreement.16 State law and policy are not displaced.17 There-
fore it seems that union shop contracts other than those made under the 
Railway Labor Act carry no imprint of federal authority and thus remain 
entirely a matter of private contract.18 Under such an analysis no question 
under the First Amendment would ever be presented. 
Paul Hanke 
16 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §158 (a) (3). 
17 Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron 8e Metal Co., note 3 supra; 
American Federation of Labor v. American Sash 8e Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949). Both 
held that in absence of conflicting federal legislation, it is a valid exercise of state police 
power to prohibit union or closed shop. 
18 But see American Communications Assn., C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), 
expressing the idea that privileges and protection given unions by the federal government 
change unions' private character-perhaps sufficiently to render union action governmental 
for purposes of the First Amendment. See also Steele v. Louisville 8e Nashville R. Co., 323 
U.S. 192 (1944), which held that union authorized by Railway Labor Act as sole bargaining 
agent is under a duty to represent all employees in its craft without discrimination 
because of race. 
